Price signalling diﬀerentiated experience goods:are uniform movie prices a puzzle? by Park, In-Uck & Song, Joon
                          Park, I-U., & Song, J. (2021). Price signalling differentiated experience





Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Korean Economic Association at
http://www.kereview.or.kr/modules/repec/backIssue_view.html?no=626&vol=37&num=1. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
Price signalling differentiated experience







Abstract. In a simple static model of differentiated experience goods supplied
by a single seller, we show that both a uniform price equilibrium and a price
signalling equilibrium coexist. This is in contrast to the received wisdom that
price signalling of quality is nonviable in static settings. We also show that the
seller’s profit is always higher in the price signalling equilibrium than in the
uniform price equilibrium, but the consumer surplus and social welfare may be
higher in either equilibrium depending on the distribution of the consumers’
tastes for the differentiated goods. (JEL Codes: D40, D82)
Keywords: experience good, movie pricing, price signalling, uniform pricing.
1 Introduction
In our living memory, movie theaters have persistently charged identical prices for
movies that differ in various dimensions. Although observed across differentiated
products of other kinds as well (e.g, downloadable music and tickets to football
matches with different teams), uniform pricing across movies is perceived as particu-
larly puzzling given the large variance both in their production costs and anticipated
demand/popularity.1 On the other hand, differential pricing is observed for various
other experience goods, and some studies attribute a significant part of it to quality
differences in some markets, such as wine (Miller, Stone, and Stuen, 2013).
∗We thank a Co-Editor and two anonymous referees for constructive comments that improved
the paper significantly. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea
Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2019S1A5A2A01047656). Corresponding address:
joonsong@skku.edu
1More popular movies are sold more through running longer. But, the standard theory generally
predicts a higher price as well as a larger quantity when the demand is bigger.
1
As a signalling device, prices face an inherent issue in that they do not incur
different costs across quality levels in ways conducive to separation, thus failing the so-
called single-crossing property which is key to effective signalling. If sellers face repeat-
purchase customers, however, this issue is alleviated and price signalling is shown to
be possible when the seller chooses a price in conjunction with an advertisement
level (Nelson, 1970; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) or customers also possess private,
individual-specific information on quality (Judd and Riordan, 1994).
Advertising is indeed prevalent in movie markets. But, effective signalling of qual-
ity by advertising is likely to result in differential (rather than uniform) pricing across
movies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).2 In addition, people seldom purchase/watch
the same movie repeatedly at the theater. Therefore, the repeat purchase models
above do not seem to account for the observed movie prices fully.
Alternatively, Wolinsky (1983) shows that prices may serve as signals when com-
petitive firms produce different quality at differential cost and consumers get imper-
fect information on quality at a cost sequentially until purchase.3 However, most
theaters in the US possess some geographic market power because they are the only
theater in town or they have exclusive licensing according to Orbach and Einav (2007)
who suggest that differential pricing, though dismissed by industry practitioners,
could benefit movie exhibitors.
In light of the discussions above, movies may be treated as differentiated ex-
perience goods without repeat purchase supplied by a single supplier at the retail
level. In such static monopoly markets for experience goods, price signalling of qual-
ity is known to be ineffective because the single-crossing property typically fails as
mentioned above. If this general insight prevails for movie theaters as well, then
differential pricing of movies would not even be feasible, let alone beneficial. Even if
price signalling proves feasible, its plausability depends on whether uniform pricing
is also viable and how the two pricing regimes compare in various criteria. To assess
how puzzling uniform pricing is and what its implications may be, therefore, one
2Also, insofar as movie advertising tends to be uninformative and for the sake of “burning money”,
the cost is unlikely to depend on the movie quality and the single-crossing property is unlikely to be
met.
3On the other hand, Heidhues and Köszegi (2008) shows that uniform pricing results from price
competition among sellers of differentiated goods to attract loss-averse consumers.
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needs first to understand possible equilibrium behavior and its welfare properties in
such markets.
To this end, we develop a simple model of differentiated experience goods supplied
by a single seller, and examine equilibrium pricing behavior and its welfare implica-
tions. Specifically, a profit-maximizing seller prices two movies of different qualities in
distinct genres, for customers who decide which movie to watch (or not at all) based
on their private tastes for the two genres as well as the prices. The customers do not
observe the qualities of the two movies, but make inferences about them from the
prices set by the seller. Their tastes for the two genres are symmetrically distributed.
The first finding is that both the uniform pricing and differential pricing/price
signalling are supported as equilibrium depending on whether or not the customers
associate high prices with higher quality. Such association is nonviable if the seller
supplies a single experience good because she would always claim high quality by
pricing high. In contrast, we show that signalling quality is possible when multiple,
differentiated experience goods are supplied, because the seller would internalize the
strategic externality in a way that the incentive to overprice a low-quality good is
mitigated by the incentive to extract a higher surplus from the consumers looking for
a high-quality good.4 A uniform price equilibrium also exists by the usual logic of
coordination failure, namely, that (price) signalling does not work if no one anticipates
it. Both the uniform price equilibrium and the price signalling equilibrium are stable
in the sense of satisfying the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
We then compare the two equilibria from the perspectives of the seller, the cus-
tomers and the social welfare. First, we show that the seller’s profit is always higher
in the price signalling equilibrium than in the uniform price equilibrium. This result
stems from the fact that customers make more efficient purchase decisions due to
price signalling of quality, hence they are willing to pay more on average.
The next question is whether more efficient choices benefit consumers as well, or
they are exploited to boost the seller’s profit. If the latter, does the boosted profit
overshadow the reduction in consumer surplus so that the total welfare is higher
with price signalling? The answers to these questions turn out to depend on the
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this intuition.
distribution of consumers’ tastes/types.
We show, by providing sufficient conditions, that price signalling improves both
consumer surplus and social welfare when customer tastes are distributed relatively
smoothly, bringing about Pareto-improvement upon uniform pricing. Relative to
uniform price equilibrium, the seller boosts sale of high quality at the expense of low
quality by reducing quality-adjusted price for the former but raising it for the latter.
The rise in the latter price is small when tastes are smoothly distributed because then
the revenue loss from raised price looms large given the already reduced volume of
low quality sale.
On the flip side, consumer surplus and social welfare may decrease with price
signalling if the distribution of tastes is sufficiently volatile: in this case, the rise in
low quality price may be drastic as the corresponding loss in sale can be small. We
provide a robust example that illuminates the underlying intuition.
We motivated our study with the movie industry, but it sheds new light on the
pricing practices and their implications in markets for differentiated experience goods
in general. Our results suggest that both uniform pricing and price signalling can
prevail in equilibrium, supported by differently coordinated beliefs of consumers on
the informational contents of the prices set by the seller. Although the seller al-
ways prefers differential pricing as it generates a higher profit, the consumers and
the society as a whole may prefer uniform pricing depending on the composition of
consumer tastes. Therefore, different pricing practices in different markets are not
only consistent with equilibrium but also possibly welfare-enhancing. Such divergent
welfare comparisons depending on the market characteristics carry potential policy
implications as well.
The model in this paper is very stylized in order to focus on the potential of
price signalling differentiated experience goods. Yet, we hope that it serves as a base
model that may be extended to address interesting related issues such as the effect of
competition, role of industry structure, and policy analysis. We leave such extensions
as future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3 and 4
characterize uniform price equilibrium and price signalling equilibrium, respectively.
Section 5 compares the two equilibria in terms of stability, profits and welfare. Section
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6 clarifies the extent to which our results apply. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
A movie exhibitor/multiplex, referred to as the seller, releases two movies, A and B,
in different genres which we also denote as A and B with a slight abuse of notation.
The seller observes the quality5 of the two movies and sets a price pm ≥ 0 for each
movie m ∈ {A,B} to maximize her expected profit. We assume that the marginal
cost is 0 (i.e., the movies are already produced) and there is no capacity constraint.
Each movie m ∈ {A,B} is one of three possible qualities, high (qm = h) or low
(qm = ℓ) with equal probability, but sometimes it turns out to be a complete flop,
which we describe as “zero” quality (qm = 0), with a small probability ϵ > 0. To
facilitate exposition, we present our analysis assuming that either one movie is of high
quality and the other is of low quality, or both are of zero quality.6 That is, (qA, qB) =
(h, ℓ) and (qA, qB) = (ℓ, h) with probability (1− ϵ)/2 each and (qA, qB) = (0, 0) with
a small probability ϵ > 0. However, we clarify in Section 6 that our main analysis
and results hold for more general distributions of movie quality, in particular, when
there is a broad range of quality levels, as well as when qA and qB are independent.
A representative consumer (of a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers of mea-
sure 1) knows the distribution of the movie quality pair specified above, but does
not observe the realized qualities. He has a private taste tm ∈ [0, 1] for the genre
m ∈ {A,B} of each movie. His type is t = (tA, tB) drawn from a joint probability
distribution µ on T := [0, 1]2 with a full support, which is symmetric between the two
movies:
µ(X) = µ({(tA, tB) | (tB, tA) ∈ X}) for all X ⊂ T. (1)
From watching a movie m for a price pm, the consumer derives a surplus of qm ·tm−pm
where qm ∈ Q := {h, ℓ, 0} denotes the realized quality and h and ℓ are real number
such that 0 < ℓ < h. The consumer watches at most one movie and maximizes his
expected surplus.
5The quality can be interpreted as the likelihood that the movie will be received well by the
viewers. The exhibitor has an informational advantage in estimating it.
6Although realistic, allowing for zero quality is inessential for our results but simplifies exposition
as clarified later.
A seller’s strategy is a mapping σs from each possible quality pair q = (qA, qB) to
a price vector p = (pA, pB) which may be restricted to p ∈ P := [0, h]2 because the
proceeds from any price exceeding h are zero. Facing a price vector p, a consumer of
type t = (tA, tB) maximizes his expected surplus by
watching A if qA(p)tA − pA ≥ max{qB(p)tB − pB, 0}
watching B if qB(p)tB − pB ≥ max{qA(p)tA − pA, 0}




q∈Q q · βm(q|p) ∈ [0, h] is the expected quality of movie m obtained
from the posterior belief βm(·|p) ∈ ∆(Q) on its quality, conditional on the price vector
p set by the seller. Thus, a strategy of the consumer is a function
σc : T × P −→ {A,B, ∅}
where σc(t, p) ∈ {A,B, ∅} encodes watching the movie A, B, or neither, contingently
on his type and price vector.7
A strategy profile (σs, σc) and a belief profile β = (βA, βB) : P → ∆(Q) ×∆(Q)
constitute a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium if (i) σc satisfies (2) given p and β, (ii)
σs(q) maximizes the seller’s expected profit given σc for each possible quality pair q,
and (iii) β conforms to Bayes rule whenever possible.
3 Uniform price equilibrium
We start with the possibility of uniform pricing, that is, the seller sets the same
price for both movies, pu = pA = pB, independently of the realized quality. Rather
than restricting the seller to set only one price for both, we explain it as equilibrium
behavior in our model (where the seller is free to set different prices).
In such equilibrium, the seller opts to set the identical equilibrium prices induc-
ing the consumer to perceive both movies of the same average quality and behave
accordingly, because any other prices would provoke the consumer’s beliefs and re-
sponses that are less lucrative. As such off-equilibrium beliefs, we postulate that the
7Note that we only consider pure strategies. This is innocuous because a mixed strategy is
optimal only for a measure zero set of types for every p by (2).
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consumer perceives both movies as zero quality if priced differently:
βA(0|pA, pB) = βB(0|pA, pB) = 1 if pA ̸= pB. (3)
Then, the seller is deterred from pricing the two movies differently because the cus-
tomer would watch neither movie, believing both are of zero quality.
As is usually the case in signalling games, a plethora of other off-equilibrium beliefs
also work so long as they assign a sufficiently low expected quality to the movie priced
higher than the equilibrium uniform price. Such beliefs always exist provided that the
minimal quality, however unlikely, is low enough, the precise level of which depends
on the distribution µ.8 Hence, we adopt a minimal quality of zero which clearly works
for all distributions and thus, simplifies exposition. This is the only role played by
zero quality in this paper. For notational ease, therefore, in the rest of the paper we
present the analysis for the limit case that ϵ = 0.9
As differential pricing would attract no customer due to (3), the seller sets identical
prices pu for both movies. Then, the consumer decides to watch one of them if and
only if




which is the case with probability µ(T (pu)) where T (pu) = {t|q̄ · max{tA, tB} ≥ pu}
is the set of consumer types whose expected surplus from watching the movie in his
favorite genre is positive. Hence, the seller faces the standard profit maximization
problem of a monopolist facing a market demand µ(T (pu)) which is decreasing in pu:
max
pu≥0
µ(T (pu)) · pu
We denote the seller’s optimal (uniform) price and profit, obtained in the standard
manner, as p∗u and π∗u, respectively. Consequently, the consumer watches the movie
in his favorite genre if his type t satisfies q̄ ·max{tA, tB} ≥ p∗u, and by the symmetry











q̄ · tA dµ. (4)
8For example, the minimal quality may be ℓ if µ is a uniform distribution.
9Keeping ϵ > 0 complicates exposition without changing the results. For instance, the average
quality would be q̄ = h+ℓ2 (1 − ϵ) instead of
h+ℓ
2 in the next paragraph. In fact, the main analysis
remains valid when h (ℓ, resp.) is reinterpreted as the expected value when the quality is high (low,
resp.) with probability 1− ϵ and zero with probability ϵ.
Thus, we have established and charaterized the equilibrium with the belief profile
(3), which we call the “uniform price equilibrium.” For expositional ease, we assume
that the equilibrium is unique, which is indeed the case for generic distribution µ.
For example, if µ is uniform on [0, 1]2 so that µ(T (pu)) = 1− (pu/q̄)2, the uniform
price equilibrium values are calculated as
p∗u = q̄/
√
















4 Price signalling equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium in which the consumer believes that the seller
signals quality by pricing the high quality movie at a higher level, that is, the belief
profile satisfies the following condition10:
βA(h|p) = βB(ℓ|p) = 1 if pA > pB,
βm(h|p) = βm(ℓ|p) = 0.5 for m ∈ {A,B} if pA = pB,
βA(ℓ|p) = βB(h|p) = 1 if pA < pB.
(6)
Given this belief, the seller obtains the same profit as in the uniform price equilibrium
by setting pA = pB = p∗u. We show below that she can do better by setting different
prices for the two movies. To facilitate exposition, we normalize ℓ = 1 in the sequel.
Note that the two movies are symmetric in the sense that two price vectors,
(pA, pB) = (p
′, p′′) and the “flipped” one (pA, pB) = (p′′, p′) where p′ ̸= p′′, put the
consumer in identical situations modulo relabeling of the movies, leading to identical
decisions of the consumer (modulo relabeling of the movies) and the same level of
profit for the seller. For expositional ease in characterizing the optimal prices given
(6), therefore, without loss of generality we take the convention of labelling the high
quality movie as A in the sequel and focus on price vectors such that pA > pB.
Suppose that the seller sets pA > pB, signalling that A is the good one. Then, the
consumer watches a movie if and only if either htA ≥ pA or tB ≥ pB. More precisely,
he watches A if his type t = (tA, tB) additionally satisfies
htA − pA > tB − pB ⇐⇒ tA >
tB + pA − pB
h
, (7)
10For the case that ϵ > 0, the probabilities 1 and 0.5 below would be 1−ϵ and (1−ϵ)/2, respectively,
in conjunction with βA(0|p) = βB(0|p) = ϵ.
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and watches B if the opposite inequality holds. It proves useful to illustrate such





















Figure 1: Decision of consumer type t = (tA, tB)
Given p = (pA, pB) where pA > pB, let τ(p) = (pAh , pB) denote the “critical
type” who is indifferent among watching A, B, and neither, as depicted in Figure 1.
Moreover, the types t ≥ τ(p) that satisfy (7) as an equality are depicted by a straight
(dashed) line from τ(p) with a slope h > 1 as illustrated in the diagram, which we
call the “A-B borderline.” Then, given p = (pA, pB), the consumer watches A if his
type t = (tA, tB) is on the right hand side (RHS) of both the vertical line through
τ(p) and the A-B borderline, and watches B if t is above the horizontal line at the
level τ(p) and on the left hand side (LHS) of the A-B borderline.
Consequently, the seller solves
max
0≤pB<pA≤h
π(pA, pB) := pAµ(TA) + pBµ(TB) (8)
where TA = {t|tA > max{pAh ,
tB+pA−pB
h
}} and TB = {t|tB > max{pB, htA−pA+pB}}.
The solution to (8) is denoted by (p∗A, p∗B) and called the “optimal signalling price.”
Then, together with the belief profile (6), the following constitutes a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE): the seller sets (p∗A, p∗B) and the consumer watches A if t ∈ TA,
watches B if t ∈ TB, and neither otherwise. We refer to this equilibrium as the “price
signalling equilibrium” and denote the seller’s profit thereof by π∗ = π(p∗A, p∗B).
Remark 1. Given that pB = pA is not in the constraint set, it is conceivable
that (8) may not have a solution for some µ if the sup π(pA, pB) is the limit value
as pB → pA. This is an inessential and technical issue of a continuous strategy
set, stemming from the fact that real numbers are not well-ordered, and can be
rectified by assuming (realistically) that there is a minimal monetary unit and the
prices should be an integer multiple of it. We adopt this assumption whenever needed
where the minimal unit is arbitrarily small, so that a solution to (8) is arbitrarily
closely approximated by a solution when the constraint set is closed (which always
exists by the Maximum Theorem). However, we believe that this issue rarely arises
and does not arise for the class of distributions considered in Proposition 3 below, for
instance. Moreover, the solution to (8) obtained as such generates a higher profit for
the seller than the uniform price equilibrium, as shown below.
Remark 2. Other kinds of price signalling equilibria are also possible supported
by belief profiles that differ from (6). In particular, if β conforms to (6) for price
vectors in a set P̃ ̸∋ (p∗A, p∗B) but conforms to the uniform price beliefs (3) for p ∈
P \ P̃ , then the optimal price for the seller is the solution to (8) subject to p ∈ P̃ ,
presuming that it is better than the uniform price vector (p∗u, p∗u). Such equilibria
require very specific coordination of consumer beliefs that treat some differential
prices as signalling quality but others not, which seems unrealistic.
5 Stability, profits and welfare comparison
This section compares the two equilibria in several criteria. Specifically, we show
that both equilibria are stable in the sense of Intuitive Criterion; the seller’s profit
is always higher in the price signalling equilibrium; but the consumer surplus and
social welfare may be higher in either equilibrium depending on the distribution of
consumer types.
5.1 Stability
Stability of equilibria in signalling games (broadly defined) is often questioned in
terms of plausibility of off-equilibrium beliefs. We apply the Intuitive Criterion (Cho
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and Kreps, 1987), a well-known refinement concept for signalling games, and verify
straightforwardly that both equilibria survive the criterion.
In our model, the seller (Sender) sends a “message” by setting a price pair (pA, pB)
based on her “type”, i.e., private information on the realized qualities of the two
movies. After an off-equilibrium message (pA, pB) is sent, what the consumer does in
the continuation game entirely determines the seller’s payoff regardless of her type.
Therefore, the maximum possible payoff of the seller from sending any off-equilibrium
message (pA, pB) is the same regardless of her type.
The seller’s equilibrium payoff in the uniform price equilibrium, π∗u, is also clearly
the same regardless of her type. Hence, the seller of no type may be deemed incon-
ceivable to have set any off-equilibrium price because she would at best do worse
than following the equilibrium while she could have done better if she were of a dif-
ferent type (i.e., according to the Intuitive Criterion). Therefore, the uniform price
equilibrium with the posterior belief (3) survives the Intuitive Criterion. The same
argument and conclusion apply to the price signalling equilibrium as well, because the
seller’s payoff there, π∗ = π(p∗A, p∗B), is the same regardless of her private information
as well (given the convention that we label the high quality movie as A).
5.2 The seller’s profit
We now show that the seller can obtain higher profits with differential pricing than
in the uniform price equilibrium. Recall that in the latter equilibrium the consumer
watches the movie in his favorite genre if q̄ ·max{tA, tB} ≥ p∗u where p∗u is the optimal
uniform price. This is depicted in Figure 2-(a), where the type t∗u = (p∗u/q̄, p∗u/q̄) on
the 45o line is the critical type for whom watching A or B or neither are all equivalent.
The seller’s profit, therefore, is p∗u times the measure µ(TA ∪ TB) = 2µ(TA) = 2µ(TB)
where the latter two equalities are due to symmetry and TA and TB are as depicted
in Figure 2-(a).
For comparison, suppose the seller signals quality by setting prices p̂A = hp∗u/q̄
and p̂B = p∗u/q̄, so that the critical type t̂ := τ(p̂A, p̂B) coincides with the critical
type t∗u above. Then, the same set of types watch a movie but some of them (those
above the 45o line and below the A-B borderline) switch from watching B to A as
in Figure 2-(b). Note that p̂A − p∗u = p∗u(h − 1)/(2q̄) = p∗u − p̂B > 0. Hence, relative
to the uniform price equilibrium, (i) the seller collects the same total revenue from
the types in T̂B depicted in Figure 2-(b) and its mirror image along the 45o line (a
subset of T̂A) under (p̂A, p̂B), and (ii) the remaining types in T̂A (the kite-shape area
symmetric around the 45o line) pay p̂A instead of p∗u under (p̂A, p̂B). Since the seller’s
profit in the price signalling equilibrium is larger than that under (p̂A, p̂B), we have
established
Proposition 1 The seller’s profit is higher in the price signalling equilibrium than



































Figure 2: Decision under uniform pricing and differential pricing
The key insight given above for this result is that the consumer is guided to choose
the better quality movie for a higher price at the intensive margin, when the optimal
uniform prices are differentiated to signal quality while keeping intact the set of types
who would watch either movie. Hence, the seller is better off by price signalling in
this way, and does even better by optimally exploiting the extensive margin as well.
5.3 Consumer surplus and social welfare
Note that the seller’s profit gain in the price signalling equilibrium stems from more
efficient choices of the consumer. The next question is whether the improved efficiency
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benefits the consumer as well, or is extracted to boost the seller’s profit via higher
prices. If the latter, does the boosted profit overshadow the reduction in consumer
surplus so that the total welfare is higher with price signalling than without?
The answers to these questions will depend on how the extensive margin changes
at the price signalling equilibrium relative to the uniform price equilibrium, which in
turn is affected by the entire distribution of the consumer types. We show below that
both consumer surplus and social welfare may be higher in either equilibrium.
We start with a sufficient condition for the social welfare and consumer surplus
to be higher in the price signalling equilibrium. Recall the price vector (p̂A, p̂B) =
(hp∗u/q̄, p
∗
u/q̄) for which the critical type t̂ = τ(p̂A, p̂B) coincides with the critical
type t∗u = (p∗u/q̄, p∗u/q̄) in the uniform price equilibrium. Note that the welfare is
higher under the signalling price vector (p̂A, p̂B) than in the uniform price equilibrium,
because the types who switch from watching B to A derive greater gross surpluses
from movie A (cf. Figure 2). Moreover, the consumer surplus is also higher as the
increase in welfare exceeds the increase in the seller’s profit (shown in Appendix).
It is intuitive that welfare is even higher with the optimal signalling price (p∗A, p∗B)
if the prices are lower for both movies than (p̂A, p̂B). This is so if the price stays
put for A (i.e., p∗A = p̂A) and is lowered for B (i.e., p∗B < p̂B) because (i) the seller’s
revenue increase from the types newly buying B (which is less than the corresponding
welfare increase) must overcompensate the revenue loss from the types switching from
A to B, and (ii) this revenue loss is larger than the corresponding decrease in welfare
because the price differential, p∗A−p∗B, is the drop in consumption value from switching
from A to B for types on the new A-B borderline who experience the largest such
drop from the switch. Then, the welfare must be higher if the price is lower for A as
well (i.e., p∗A < p̂A and p∗B < p̂B).
This line of reasoning extends to the cases where the price is increased for B, but
the price drop for A is larger, that is, p̂A − p∗A > p∗B − p̂B > 0. As the price changes






, 0< tB < p̂B} of types







cease to buy movie B. In addition, let µAA, µBB and µBA denote the measure of types
who stay with movie A, stay with movie B, and switch from B to A, resp., as depicted
in Figure 3. Because the revenue gain from the types in the sets µ+A ∪ µBA ∪ µBB
must exceed the loss from those in µ−B ∪ µAA, we deduce that the welfare gain for
types in µ+A ∪ µBA exceeds the welfare loss for types in µ−B. Since the welfare is


















Figure 3: Change of decisions by consumer types
price signalling enhances welfare. The same is shown to be the case for consumer
surplus (in Appendix), establishing a sufficient condition stated below.
Proposition 2 The social welfare and consumer surplus are higher in the price sig-
nalling equilibrium (p∗A, p∗B) than in the uniform price equilibrium (p∗u, p∗u) if
p̂A − p∗A > max{p∗B − p̂B, 0}. (9)
Proof. In Appendix A.
However, the sufficient condition (9) is not very useful as it is expressed in terms
of solution values. It would be practically more useful to know when (9) holds in
terms of the primitive data of the model, such as µ, but a general characterization is
difficult. Hence, we proceed our anaysis by focusing on the cases that the consumer’s
taste tm for each genre is independently distributed according to a common cdf F (t)
on [0,1] with a continuous density function f(t) = F ′(t).
We first derive a necessary condition which the optimal signalling price (p∗A, p∗B)
must satisfy in terms of the critical type τ(p∗A, p∗B) it induces, when the tastes are
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independent. Then, we identify a property implied by (9) on the derived necessary
condition and thereby, discuss what kind of distributions F may satisfy (9).
Consider a signalling price vector p = (pA, pB) such that the maximal type t̄ =
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< 0 as pB → 1 so that π(p) is not maximized at a price vector

















)f(pB) = 1. (10)
In fact, (10) is also the analogous necessary condition calculated for price vectors such
that the A-B borderline has t̄ = (1, 1) on its left side (see Appendix B).












































We now simplify the necessary condition (10). Recalling that (pA
h
, pB) = τ(pA, pB)
is the critical type induced by a price vector (pA, pB) under belief (6), we may rewrite
(10) as a function of critical type t = (tA, tB) induced by price vector as follows (via
a change of variables):
Z(t) := F (tA)F (tB) + tAf(tA)F (tB) + tBF (tA)f(tB) = 1. (10
∗)
11If the supremum of π(p) is obtained somewhere on the boundary where pA = pB (see Remark
1), say at (pA, pB) = (p̃, p̃), then π(p) must be maximized at (p̃, p̃) along the said boundary. It is
verified that the corresponding FOC implies that (10) holds at (pA, pB) = (p̃, p̃).
This condition is symmetric between tA and tB, hence facilitates exposition and dis-
cussion. Note that Z(t) is nonnegative, assumes 0 when tA = 0 or tB = 0 and exceeds
1 when tA = tB = 1.
Let us consider the cases that Z(t) increases both in tA and in tB. This is so if
tf(t) increases in t, for instance. Then, there is t ∈ (0, 1) such that (10∗) holds at
(tA, tB) = (t, 1) and (tA, tB) = (1, t); moreover, there is a decreasing function
ρ : [t, 1] → [t, 1] with ρ(t) = 1 and ρ(1) = t,
that solves (10∗) in the sense that (10∗) holds at (tA, tB) = (tA, ρ(tA)) for all tA ∈ [t, 1].
















, and has a slope of −1 at the crossing point, as illustrated in Figure














Figure 4: Condition for price signalling to improve welfare
Finally, we are ready to link the sufficient condition (9) with the properties of ρ
which is expressed in terms of the primitive data F via (10∗). Given the negative
slope of ρ, the condition (9) implies that τ(p∗) is above the 45o line but below the
straight line going through the uniform price equilibrium critical type t∗u = t̂ with a
slope −h,12 which we call “the line for (9)” and indicate by a dashed (red), negatively-
12That is, p̂A − p∗A > p∗B − p̂B implies p∗B < p̂B − h(p∗A/h− p̂A/h).
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sloped straight line from t∗u in Figure 4. In addition, the condition p∗A > p∗B means
that τ(p∗) is on the RHS of the straight line from the origin with a slope of h, called
the “signalling price line” and indicated as another dashed (red) line in Figure 4.
Therefore, if τ(p∗) is inside the triangle formed by these three lines, the welfare and
consumer surplus are higher at the price signalling equilibrium by Proposition 2.
This condition is easily verified for the benchmark case of a uniform distribution
F (t) = t. In this case, (10∗) simplifies to tAtB = 1/3 so that ρ is convex, crosses the
45o line at t∗u = ( 1√3 ,
1√
3
), and has a slope −ρ(tA)/tA which is −h when ρ(tA) = htA,
i.e., when it crosses the signalling price line. Hence, τ(p∗) is inside the triangle formed
by the three lines, provided that the profit π(p) increases as the price vector changes
so that the corresponding critical type moves northwest along the graph of ρ below
the 45o line. This is indeed verified to be the case because ∂π(p)
∂pB
= (1 + 4pA − 4pB −
6pApB + 3p
2




price signalling improves social welfare and consumer surplus if F is uniform.
By continuity, therefore, both the welfare and consumer surplus are higher in the
price signalling equilibrium for all F sufficiently close to a uniform distribution. This
observation can be formalized in the following two manners:
(a) There is r > 0 such that social welfare and consumer surplus are higher in the
price signalling equilibrium if |f(t)− 1| < r for all t ∈ [0, 1].
(b) There is r′ > 0 such that social welfare and consumer surplus are higher in the
price signalling equilibrium if |f ′(t)| < r′ for all t ∈ [0, 1].
To gain further insights, we focus on distributions with a linear density function,
f(t) = a+2(1−a)t for a ∈ (0, 2), and verify that price signalling enhances welfare for
a large subset of such distributions in the next result. Recall that the function ρ is
well-defined if tf(t) increases, which is the case for linear f(t) if and only if a ≤ 4/3.
Proposition 3 The social welfare and consumer surplus are higher in the price sig-
nalling equilibrium than in the uniform price equilibrium if f(t) = a+2(1−a)t where
0 < a ≤ 4/3.
Proof. In Appendix C.
A general insight emerges from the discussions above: welfare is higher in the
price signalling equilibrium when the density function f(t) does not vary too wildly
in t. Relative to the uniform price equilibrium, the seller increases sale of the high
quality movie at the expense of low quality one by reducing quality-adjusted price for
the former but raising it for the latter. The rise in the latter price is relatively small if
f(t) doesn’t change rapidly because then the revenue loss from the raised price looms
large given the already reduced volume of the low quality sale. Proposition 3 suggests
that this result may prevail quite broadly. In fact, our Mathematica simulation for
linear f (presented in Figure 5) suggests that welfare is higher at the price signalling
equilibrium for all h if a < 1.8.
Figure 5: Comparison of social welfare
On the other hand, if the revenue loss from the raised price for the low quality
movie is contained because f(t) drops rapidly as t increases from the uniform price
critical type t∗u, the seller may gain by raising it significantly to boost the revenue
from the retained customers, resulting in a reduced welfare in the price signalling
equilibrium.13 The size of the retained customers must be sufficiently large for this
13This is reminiscent of the third degree price discrimination arising from elasticity differences
across consumer groups that can be separated. But, our model differs because the two market are
inseparable and their demands are interrelated and endogenously determined by the prices set by the
seller. For this reason, even when there is no elasticity difference in the absence of price signalling
(so that the third degree price discrimination is irrelevant), differential pricing may enhance the
social welfare as well as the profit (e.g., when F is uniform).
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to happnen, implying that f(t) should be large enough for the types t of the retained
customers. This further means that f(t) should surge after a sharp drop above the
critical type t∗u, implying a wild fluctuation of f(t).
We provide a robust such example below. A general characterization of F for
which price signalling reduces welfare relative to the uniform price equilibrium, how-
ever, is a nontrivial task that is sensitive to various details of the function F and goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
Example: F is concentrated on t0 = 0, t1 = 0.5 and t2 ∈ (0.75, 0.8).
Consider the case that F has three equal point masses of 1/3 each at t0, t1 and t2
as above, so that the nine consumer types t ∈ {t0, t1, t2} × {t0, t1, t2} have an equal
mass of 1/9 each according to µ. Suppose that h is close to but less than t2/t1.
We show that both the consumer surplus and social welfare are higher in the uniform
price equilibrium in this case. Then, it is clear by continuity that the same conclusion
prevails for all F sufficiently nearby with a full support.
Uniform pricing regime : Consider prices pu ∈ [0, h] that the seller may set for
both movies. If pu ≤ t1q̄ then all types except t = (0, 0) watch their favorate movie,
generating a profit of 8pu/9 for the seller (assuming that the consumer watches a
movie when he is indifferent between watching one and not at all). If t1q̄ < pu ≤ t2q̄,
all types with tA = t2 or tB = t2 watch their favorate movie, generating a profit
of 5pu/9. If pu > t2q̄, the profit is 0. Since 8t1q̄/9 = 4q̄/9 > 5t2q̄/9, the optimal
uniform price is p∗u = t1q̄. Thus, in the uniform price equilibrium, the seller’s profit
is π∗u = 4q̄/9, the social welfare is Wu = q̄(3t1 + 5t2)/9 assuming that the consumer
watches one randomly when indifferent between the two movies, and the consumer
surplus is Wu − π∗u = q̄(3t1 + 5t2 − 4)/9.
Price signalling regime : It is clear that pricing to attract the lowest type t = (0, 0)
is not worth it. The best differential pricing to attract all other types is to set
(pA, pB) = (ht1, t1),14 which generates a profit of (3t1 + 5ht1)/9 for the seller. She
may increase pB arbitrarily close to ht1 while keeping pA = ht1, increasing the revenue
from types (t0, t2) and (t1, t2) by ht1 − t1 at the cost of losing the revenue of t1 from
the type (t0, t1). Since 2(ht1 − t1) ≈ 2(t2 − t1) > 0.5 = t1 given h ≈ t2/t1, the seller’s
14This is interpreted as the limit of (pA, pB) = (ht1 − ε, t1) as ε → 0.
profit is higher. As it is easily verified that she cannot increase her profit with any
other prices, the seller’s profit in the price signalling equilibrium is arbitrarily close
to π∗ = 7ht1/9, the social welfare to Ws = (2t2 + 2ht1 + 3ht2)/9, and the consumer
surplus to Ws − π∗ = (2t2 − 5ht1 + 3ht2)/9.
Therefore, the social welfare is higher in the uniform price equilibrium because
Wu −Ws =
3t1 + t2 − (t1 + t2)h
18
>








and so is the consumer surplus as q̄(3t1 + 5t2 − 4)/9 − (2t2 − 5ht1 + 3ht2)/9 =
(2.5− t2)(h− 1)/18 > 0.
6 Extension to independent movie quality
In this section we extend the results obtained in Sections 3-5 to the case that the
two movie qualities qm for m ∈ {A,B} are independent of each other. First, the off-
equilibrium beliefs (3) continue to be valid in this case and the subsequent analysis is
unaffected because it depends only on the expected quality; hence, the uniform price
equilibrium is unaffected, either.
Next, we reformulate the price signalling equilibrium for the independent case.
Recall that in Section 4 we have shown that
(∗) if the consumer behaves optimally under the belief profile (6), i.e., believing
that the expected quality of a movie is h (ℓ, resp.) if it is priced higher (lower,
resp.) than the other movie, then the seller maximizes her profit by pricing one
movie at p∗A and the other at p∗B where (p∗A, p∗B) solves (8).
Hence, this pricing strategy constitutes an equilibrium together with the consumer’s
optimal decision given (6), so long as the expected quality of the movie priced at p∗A
(p∗B, resp.) is indeed h (ℓ, resp.). When the movie qualities are inversely correlated,
this is the case (as shown in Section 4) if the seller prices
(a) the high quality movie at p∗A and the low quality movie at p∗B.
In the current case where the two movie qualities are independent, suppose that
the seller continues to price the two movies as described in (a) if they are of different
qualities, but
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(b) prices one movie at p∗A and the other at p∗B with equal probability if they are
of the same quality.15
Then, by Bayes rule, a movie priced at p∗A is of high quality with probability 3/4,
whereas a movie priced at p∗B is of high quality with probability 1/4.
Consequently, if we reinterpret h and ℓ as the expected quality of a movie which
is of high quality with probability 3/4 and 1/4, respectively, then the belief profile (6)
is consistent with the seller’s strategy of pricing as in (a) when the movie qualities
are different and as in (b) otherwise. By (∗) above, therefore, such pricing strategy
of the seller constitutes, together with the consumer’s optimal decision given (6), an
equilibrium for the case that the movie qualities are independent. Note that the
prices signal the quality less than perfectly in this case. Nevertheless, the discussions
in Section 5 on stability, profits and welfare are not affected at all.
Remark 3. More generally, suppose that each qm is distributed according to a
common distribution with a support Q ⊂ R+. Partition Q into Qh and Qℓ so that
the expected quality conditional on qm ∈ Qh is h and that conditional on qm ∈ Qℓ
is ℓ < h. Then, the arguments above remain valid when all quality levels in Qh are
treated identically (as “high” quality) and so are all levels in Qℓ (as “low” quality) in
the seller’s pricing strategy. This is so because the consumer’s behavior is determined
entirely by the expected qualities/beliefs associated with the prices, and the seller’s
profit is independent of her private information given such consumer’s behavior.
7 Conclusion
We study equilibrium pricing behavior and its welfare implications in a stylized model
of a single supplier of differentiated experience goods. Both uniform pricing and price
signalling can prevail in equilibrium, supported by differently coordinated beliefs of
consumers on the informational contents of the prices. This is in contrast with the
general insight that price signalling is nonviable in static monopoly markets of a single
experience good. The seller’s profit is always higher in the price signalling equilibrium,
but the welfare of the consumers and the society can be higher in the uniform pricing
15Recall that we present analysis assuming ϵ = 0. See Remark 3 below on how the analysis extends
to the case that qm = 0 with probability ϵ > 0.
depending on market characteristics. Therefore, different pricing practices in different
markets are consistent with equilibrium and possibly welfare-enhancing. We believe
that these findings shed some new light on how the market operates for differentiated
experience goods.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2.
It remains to consider the case that p∗B−p̂B ≥ 0. Recall the measures µ+A, µ−B, µAA, µBB
and µBA (cf. Figure 3). Since p̂A − p∗A > p∗B − p̂B ≥ 0 by (9) and µAA > µBB +µBA +
µ−B, the seller’s revenue from types who stay with the same movie decreases by
µAA(p̂A − p∗A) − µBB(p∗B − p̂B) > (µBB + µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A) − µBB(p∗B − p̂B) >
(µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A).
For it to be optimal for the seller to set (p∗A, p∗B), therefore, her revenue increase
from µ+A and µBA must exceed the loss from µ−B by at least (µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A).
The revenue increase from µ+A is µ+Ap∗A (lower than the consumer surplus increase),
that from µBA is µBA(p∗A−p̂B) whereas the corresponding increase in consumer surplus
is at least µBA(p∗A − p∗B) because the types on the new A-B borderline is willing to
pay p∗A − p∗B more for A than for B, reflecting social surplus increase for such types.
The revenue loss from µ−B is µ−B p̂B while the corresponding loss in social welfare is





A − p̂B)− µ−B p̂B ≥ (µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A)
=⇒ µ+Ap∗A + µBA(p∗A − p∗B)− µ−Bp∗B ≥ (µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A + p̂B − p∗B) ≥ 0,
i.e., social welfare is higher at the price signalling equilibrium than at (p̂A, p̂B), which
in turn is higher than at the uniform price equilibrium.
Moreover, as price vector changes from (p̂A, p̂B) to (p∗A, p∗B), the increase in social






= (µBA + µ−B)(p̂A − p∗A + p̂B − p∗B) > 0.
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As the social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and the seller’s profit, this
means that the consumer surplus increases as prices change from (p̂A, p̂B) to (p∗A, p∗B).
Consequently, pricing signalling increases the consumer surplus provided that it is
higher at the price vector (p̂A, p̂B) than at the uniform price equilibrium, which we
show to be the case below.
Recall from the discussion preceding Proposition 1 that, relative to the uniform
price equilibrium, at (p̂A, p̂B) the seller’s profit increases by (p̂A − p∗u) times twice the
measure of the types who switch from B to A. For these types, movie A is more
valuable that B by at least the price differential pA − pB = 2(p̂A − p∗u) where the
equality follows from p̂A − p∗u = p∗u − p̂B. Therefore, the welfare increases more than
the seller’s profit, implying that the consumer surplus is higher with the price vector
(p̂A, p̂B) than at the uniform price equilibrium, as desired.
B. Derivation of (10) for prices such that the A-B borderline has t̄ = (1, 1)
on its left side:












pB + (pA − pB)F (pB + htA − pA)
]
dF (tA).




































C. Proof of Proposition 3.




a4 − 8a3 + 20a2 − 24a+ 20









to ρ(1) = t at tA = 1. The value t decreases from 1/
√
5 ≈ 0.4472 from a = 0 to 1/3
at a = 1 and to approximately 0.315 at a = 4/3 as indicated above. There is a unique
fixed point of ρ, which in fact is the critical type t∗u = p∗u/q̄ in the uniform equilibrium
price (with a slight abuse of notation t∗u). Note that t∗u is independent of q̄ (hence, of
h) because q̄ is just denotes the quality of the product and can be normalized in the
uniform pricing regime.
Lemma a. t∗u has values in the interval (0.525, 0.67) and decreases in a < 4/3.
Proof. From (10∗), t∗u solves
F (t)2 + 2tF (t)f(t) = t2(a(1− t) + t)(5t+ a(3− 5t)) = 1.
It is routinely verified that F (t)2 +2tF (t)f(t) increases in t, has a value lower than 1
for all a ∈ [0, 1] when t = 0.525, but has a value larger than 1 for all a ∈ [0, 1] when
t = 0.67. Hence, t∗u ∈ (0.525, 0.67). Since F (t)2 + 2tF (t)f(t) increases both in a and
t when t ∈ (0.525, 0.67), t∗u decreases in a ∈ (0, 4/3). □
Lemma b. ρ : [t, 1] → [t, 1] is convex.
Proof. Due to symmetry, it suffices to show convexity for ρ : [t∗u, 1] → [t, t∗u]. By

































We show below that the absolute value
∣∣ZtA
ZtB
∣∣ decreases in tA and increases in tB.




∣∣ with respect to tA, we get
−tBΨA













2(tA(23− 60tB)tB + 8t2B + 2t2A(4− 45tB + 75t2B)).
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= 8(1− a)2(25t2A(1− a)2 + 20atA(1− a) + 8a2) > 0, ∀ 0 < a < 4/3.
Since ∂ΨA
∂tB
|tB=0 = 4a(1 − a)(30t2A(1 − a)2 + 23atA(1 − a) + 9a2) > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1),
therefore, it follows that ΨA > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1). For a ∈ (1, 4/3), we calculate that
∂ΨA
∂tB
|tB=0 < 0 and ∂ΨA∂tB |tB=1 < 0, as well as ΨA
∣∣
tB=1








∣∣ with respect to tB, we get
ΨB






B +40atAtB(3tB +2tA(1− 5tB))+ 4a3(2tB(3− 8tB)+ tA(9− 46tB +
90t2B) − 4t2A(4 − 15tB + 25t2B)) + a4(9 − 24tB + 32t2B + 4t2A(8 − 20tB + 25t2B) −
4tA(9− 23tB + 30t2B)) + 4a2(tA(23− 90tB)tB + 8t2B + 2t2A(4− 30tB + 75t2B)).











= 4(1− a)(5tA(a− 1)− 2a)
(











= 8(1− a)2(5tA(1− a) + 4a)(5tA(1− a) + 2a) > 0.
Since ∂ΨB
∂tB
|tB=0 = 4a(1 − a)(4tA(1 − a) + 3a)(5tA(1 − a) + 2a) > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1),
therefore, it follows that ΨB > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1). For a ∈ (1, 4/3), we calculate that
∂ΨB
∂tB
|tB=0 < 0 and ∂ΨB∂tB |tB=1 < 0, as well as ΨB
∣∣
tB=1




∣∣ increases in tB as desired. □
Lemma c. If ρ(tA) < htA for tA < t∗u, then ρ(tA) < t∗u + (t∗u − tA)h.
Proof. Solving F (t∗u)2 + 2t∗uF (t∗u)f(t∗u) = 1 for a, we get
α(t∗u) =
−4(t∗u)3 + 5(t∗u)4 +
√
(t∗u)
2(3− 8t∗u + 5(t∗u)2 + (t∗u)4)
(t∗u)
2(3− 8t∗u + 5(t∗u)2)
.
That is, α(t∗u) is the value of a ∈ (0, 2) for which t∗u is the critical type in the uniform
price equilibrium. For tu ∈ (0.525, 0.67), therefore, it suffices to show for a = α(tu)
that Z > 1 at (tA, tB) ∈ [0, tu]× [tu, 1] that solves tB = htA and tB = tu + (tu − tA)h
if exists, or that solves tB = 1 = tu + (tu − tA)h < htA.
The former solution is tA = (1 + h)tu/(2h) and tB = (1 + h)tu/2 so long as
(1 + h)tu/2 < 1, i.e., h < (2/tu) − 1. The value of Z evaluated at that solution for





5(1 + h)2t2u −
2(1 + h)2(4− 5tu)
(
4t2u − 5t3u −
√
3− 8tu + 5t2u + t4u
)
3− 8tu + 5t2u
+
(
tu(8− 5tu)(1 + h2)− 2h(6− 8tu + 5t2u)
)(
4t2u − 5t3u −
√
3− 8tu + 5t2u + t4u
)2
t2u(3− 8tu + 5t2u)2
]
(12)
which is routinely calculated to be 1 when h = 1. The partial derivative of the
expression in the big bracket with respect to h is
10(1 + h)t2u +
4(1 + h)(5tu − 4)
(
4t2u − 5t3u −
√
3− 8tu + 5t2u + t4u
)
3− 8tu + 5t2u
+
2(6 + tu(5tu − 8)(1 + h))
(
4t2u − 5t3u −
√
3− 8tu + 5t2u + t4u
)2
t2u(3− 8tu + 5t2u)2
which is linear in h with values 4/t2u at h = 1 and
4×
15 + 51t3u − 120t4u + 75t5u − 40tu + 25t2u + (30t2u − 24tu)
√
3− 8tu + 5t2u + t4u
(tu − 1)t2u(3− 5tu)2
at h = (2/tu) − 1, both of which are positive for tu ∈ (0.525, 0.67). Since (1 + h)/h
also increases in h, therefore, the value of Z evaluated at tA = (1 + h)tu/(2h) and
tB = (1 + h)tu/2 for a = α(tu), (12), exceeds 1 so long as h < (2/tu)− 1, as desired.
For h > (2/tu)− 1, since Z increases in tA, it follows that Z exceeds 1 at tB = 1 and
tA = (tu(1 + h)− 1)/h, as desired. □
Proposition 2 applies as the condition (9) holds by Lemmas b and c so long as the
price signalling equilibrium (p∗A, p∗B) satisfies p∗A/h < p∗B. This is indeed the case by
the next lemma. (Below we return to use pA rather than tA = pA/h in calculations.)
Lemma d. ∂π(p)
∂pB
> 0 along ρ if pB < tA = pA/h.
Proof. Recall t∗u decreases in a from 0.66874 at a = 0 to 0.63116 at a = 1/2, to
0.6 at a = 22/27 ≈ 0.815, to 0.577 at a = 1, and to 0.525 at a = 4/3.
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(i) We show that ∂π(p)
∂pB
≥ 0 at p = (ht∗u, t∗u). From
∂π(p)
∂pB
evaluated at pA = hpB, we
get X/(6h2) where










5p2B − 2)+ 3h2pB(2− 3pB − 8p2B +10p3B)+ 2h(1− 8pB +9p2B +8p3B − 10p4B)
)
.
We need to show that X > 0 for all relevant values of pB = t∗u.










> 0, then the seller would increase her profit by increasing the common
price above p∗u, violating optimality of p∗u. Hence, X|h=1,pB=p∗u = 0.
Therefore, it suffices to show that
∂X/∂h = 4pB(4 + 9(−1 + h)pB + (5− 15h)p3B)− a2(−1 + pB)(−1 + 3pB + (12−
36h)p2B+20(−1+3h)p3B)+4a(1+(−8+6h)pB−9(−1+h)p2B+(8−24h)p3B+
10(−1 + 3h)p4B)
is positive for all h ≥ 1 at pB = t∗u and a = α(t∗u) for relevant values of t∗u ∈ (0.52, 0.67).









∂2X/∂h2 = −12pB(pB(−3 + 5p2B) + a2pB(3− 8pB + 5p2B) + a(−2 + 3pB + 8p2B −
10p3B)) > 0
for relevant values. Specifically, ∂X/∂h
∣∣
h=1
is (i) concave in a when the coefficient of
a2 is negative (which is the case if pB < 0.546...) peaking at a value of a < 0, and
achieves a positive value at a = 4/3, and (ii) convex in a when the coefficient of a2 is
positive (which is the case if pB > 0.546...) bottoming out at a value of a > 4/3, and
achieves a positive value at a = α(pB). Hence, ∂X/∂h
∣∣
h=1
> 0 is verified. Similarly,
∂2X/∂h2 is (i) convex in a when the coefficient of a2 is positive (which is the case
if pB < 0.6) bottoming out at a value of a < 0, and achieves a positive value at
a = 0, and (ii) concave in a when the coefficient of a2 is negative (which is the case if
pB > 0.6) peaking at a value of a > 4/3, and achieves a positive value at a = α(pB).
Hence, ∂2X/∂h2 > 0 is verified.
(ii) We show that ∂π(p)
∂pB
decreases in pB and increases in pA for (pA, pB) ∈ [hpB, h]×
[0, t∗u]. (The calculation below is when A-B borderline hits top line. The other case















B − 10p3B + h(3− 6p2B)−









increases in pA amounts to showing that Y > 0 for relevant
ranges of variable values. Note that ∂Y/∂pA = 6(1− a)(3− 5p2B + apB(−4 + 5pB)) is
positive (neg.) for a < 1 (a > 1). For a < 1, therefore, it suffices to show that Y is
positive at pA = hpB. From
Y |pA=hpB = 2(4 + 9(−1 + h)pB + (5− 15h)p3B) + a2(−3hpB(3− 12pB + 10p2B) +
2(1− 6p2B + 5p3B)) + 2a(−5 + 9pB + 6p2B − 10p3B + 3h(1− 3pB − 6p2B + 10p3B))
we calculate that ∂Y |pA=hpB
∂h
= 6pB(3− 5p2B)− 3a2pB(3− 12pB +10p2B)+ 6a(1− 3pB −
6p2B+10p
3
B) and that Y |pA=hpB ,h=1 = 8−20p3B+a2(2−9pB+24p2B−20p3B)+4a(−1−
6p2B + 10p
3
B), both of which are routinely verified to be positive for a < α(pB) and
pB < 0.67,16 establishing that Y is positive for a < 1.
Similarly, for a ∈ (1, 4/3) it suffices to show that Y is positive at pA = h. From




2(−3hpB(−5 + 6pB) + 2(1− 6p2B + 5p3B))
we calculate that ∂Y |pA=h
∂h
= 18− 30p2B − 3a2pB(−5+6pB)+12a(−1− 2pB +4p2B) and
that Y |pA=h,h=1 = 2(13− 9pB − 15p2B + 5p3B)− 2a(11 + 3pB − 30p2B + 10p3B) + a2(2 +
15pB −30p2B +10p3B), both of which are routinely verified to be positive for pB < 1/3.
Since ρ(tA) is convex with values of ρ(t∗u) = t∗u and ρ(1) = t, for pB ∈ (1/3, 0.57)
we only need to show Y to be positive at pA = (0.57+(0.57−pB) 1−0.570.57−1/3)h. This can
be shown similarly: evaluate Y at this value of pA, and verify that both its derivative




To show that ∂π(p)
∂pB
decreases in pB, observe that the integrand (the expression
inside the square bracket) in ∂π(p)
∂pB
is fully determined by pA − pB, hence decreasing
pB has the same effect as increasing pA. Since decreasing pB additionally expands the
range of integration, enlarging the effect on the integral value. The effect on the first
16Specifically, they are shown to be positive for pB < 0.67 if a < 0.5 and for pB < 0.64 if
a ∈ (0.5, 1).
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term of ∂π(p)
∂pB
is positive from decreasing pB but negative from increasing pA. Since
∂π(p)
∂pB
increases in pA as shown above, it follows that it increases as pB decreases, as
desired.
This completes the proof of Lemma d and, thus, the proof of Proposition 3.
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